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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 1 
CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) Case No. 960270-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT 0? THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
1. Does defendant's brief comply with the requirements of 
Anders and Clayton by adequately illustrating that defendant's 
claims have no merit? 
Once the court determines that the required elements of an 
Anders brief are present, this Court will grant defendant's 
counsel's request to withdraw and will affirm the conviction only 
when the Court unanimously finds the issues presented are %%wholly 
frivolous." State V, Clayton, 639 P.2d 168# 170 (Utah 1981). 
2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. 
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170,175 (Utah App. 1992). The review of 
counsel's performance, however, is "highly deferential" to avoid 
second guessing counsel's performance *on the basis of an 
inanimate record." State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
3. Was defendant denied due process as guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution? 
Claims based on a denial of due process are questions of law 
that the appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Adams. 83 0 
P.2d 310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1992) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES 
Addendum A contains that texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 
and 58-37a-5 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of a controlled 
substance, cocaine, a second degree felony, possession of a ' 
controlled substance, marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
i 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 and 58-37a-5 (1996) (R. 4-
5). After the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence seized from defendant, defendant entered an 
unconditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor, and attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 131-37). The 
court sentenced defendant to 45 days in the Washington County 
Jail (R. 311) . 
Unhappy with trial counsel's performance, defendant timely 
filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 161). The State appointed 
current counsel to represent defendant in this appeal (R. 164). 
Defendant has not contacted his current counsel regarding this 
appeal and current counsel does not know defendant's whereabouts. 
Appellant's Brief at 5. Consequently, defendant's counsel is 
unaware of any specific basis upon which defendant wishes to 
pursue an appeal beyond a general dissatisfaction with his 
representation at trial. Id. 
Defendant's counsel reviewed the transcript and found 
no non-frivolous basis upon which to appeal. Id^ . at 5-6. As a 
result, on December 19, 1996, defendant's counsel filed a brief 
pursuant to Anders V» California, 386 U-S, 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 
(1967) and State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981) ("Anders 
3 
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brief"). The State moved to strike the brief for failing to 
comply Anders and Clayton. This Court granted the State's 
motion. This brief is in response to defendant's counsel's 
corrected Anders brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Acting on information garnered from three informants and 
their own corroborating observations, law enforcement officers 
arrested defendant after a pat-down search and subsequent search 
incident to arrest revealed contraband (R. 76). 
On April 2, 1994, Officers Montanez and Wright were 
assisting St. George police during spring break festivities (R. 
195). At approximately 9:30 p.m. the officers noticed three 
young men drinking beer near room 232 of the Motel 6 (R. 195-96, 
218). The officers determined that the young men were juveniles 
and issued citations for consumption of alcohol by a minor (R. 
196, 217). The juveniles bartered with the officers, exchanging 
information regarding drug transactions that had occurred earlier 
in the day for the dismissal of their citations (R. 196). 
The juveniles informed the officers that earlier that day 
they had seen a blue 4x4 pickup truck (possibly a Dodge Dakota) \ 
with two men, slightly older than themselves, supplying and 
selling different types of drugs (R, 197, 219). The truck had 
4 
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been in the parking lot of the Motel 6 earlier that evening and 
the juveniles expected the truck to return later and continue 
with drug transactions (R. 197). The transactions would take 
place either in room 232 of the Motel 6 or in the parking lot 
just below the room (R. 198, 219). The juveniles seemed well 
versed in street drug vernacular, bolstering their assertions 
that they knew the individuals engaged in drug transactions (R. 
218) . 
The officers left the motel in order to procure a less 
conspicuous automobile (R. 199). When the officers returned to 
the Motel 6 at approximately 10:30 they discovered a blue 4x4 
pickup parked perpendicularly to the parking spaces right below 
room 232, just as the juveniles predicted (R. 200, 220) . The 
truck contained two people in the cab and two more people sitting 
in the back (R. 200). The truck was surrounded by several people 
who scattered upon the officer's arrival (R. 200, 220). The 
officers, as a result of the information given by the juveniles 
and the sudden scattering of people in the parking lot, concluded 
that this was the truck from which the informants told them drugs 
were sold (R. 200, 224). 
The truck immediately left the parking lot (R. 201, 220). 
The officers directed a nearby Trooper to effectuate a traffic 
5 
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stop of the truck because the officer's car did not have the 
necessary equipment to make the stop (R. 208, 214). The Trooper 
pulled the truck over noticing two violations. First, the 
truck's tires exceeded the periphery of the vehicle without the 
required mud flaps, and second the passengers were seated on the 
side rather than the truck bed (R. 259). While the Trooper 
warned the driver of the violations, the officers questioned 
defendant who was a passenger in the truck bed (R. 208-09, 260). 
The officers informed defendant that they had received a tip 
that the individuals in the truck were selling drugs and asked 
defendant if he had any drugs in his possession (R. 213, 223-
24). Defendant became nervous and repeatedly put his hands into 
his pockets even after the officers requested that he keep his 
hands in view (R. 209, 213, 214). Worried about their safety, 
the officers conducted a Terry pat-down search for weapons and 
discovered a knife concealed in defendant's clothing (R. 76, 255-
56, 274-75). A subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered 
the drugs and drug paraphernalia from which the possession 
charges stem (R. 76). 
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the i 
evidence seized during the search, arguing that the officers did 
not have reasonable suspicion to detain him (R. 40-41). The 
6 
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trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 73-80). 
Defendant subsequently entered an unconditional guilty plea to 
attempted possession of a control substance, a class A 
misdemeanor and possession of a controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 130-37). Defendant was sentence to one year in 
the Washington County Jail and ordered to pay a fine of $925.00. 
The trial court stayed the sentence and placed defendant on three 
years probation, including 120 days of house arrest (R. 302). 
On April 17, 1996, defendant determined that house arrest 
was unreasonable and voluntarily checked into the Washington 
County Jail and requested the court modify his sentence (R. 309-
11). The court resentenced defendant to 45 days of jail time (R. 
311) . 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 165). 
Defendant contacted his current counsel once from the Washington 
County Jail and once after his release from jail. Appellant's 
Brief at 5. Defendant alleged he had not received adequate 
representation from prior counsel but failed to detail any 
specific instances of deficient performance. Id. Defendant's 
counsel has had no further contact with defendant. Id. 
SUMMARY 0? THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appellate counsel has fulfilled the requirements 
7 
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for an Anders brief to the extent possible under the 
circumstances. Counsel's Anders brief contains an adequate 
factual summary and legal argument, supported with citations to 
relevant authority, to support his conclusion that defendant 
cannot make an argument on appeal that is not wholly frivolous. 
Before abandoning contact with his attorney, defendant did not 
articulate any specific basis for his appeal beyond a general 
dissatisfaction with trial counsel's performance. Therefore, 
current counsel can only speculate as to the deficiencies upon 
which defendant wishes to base this appeal. 
Furthermore, defendant's appellate counsel correctly 
concludes that defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel. Defendant was represented by two attorneys. The 
existing record indicates that the performance of both those 
attorneys was objectively reasonable at all phases of the 
proceedings. Counsel can find nothing in the record to overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel adequately represented 
defendant. Thus, any argument that defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel must fail as wholly frivolous. 
Finally, by entering an unconditional guilty plea, defendant i 
waived all pre-plea constitutional violations. Nothing in the 
record supports nor does defendant allege that the unconditional 
v ••• i 
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guilty plea was not voluntary. Consequently, any argument that 
defendant was denied due process is similarly wholly frivolous. 
Thus, this Court should dismiss defendant's appeal and grant 
appellate counsel's motion to withdraw. 
ARgUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
MDEE£ AND £L&X1Q£ 
Defendant's brief complies with the requirements for an 
Anders brief as set forth in State Vt Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 
(Utah 1981). Clayton requires that an Anders brief contain the 
following information: ua statement of the facts, a description 
of the proceedings and the citation of pertinent authorities 
sufficient to permit this Court to fulfill its obligation . . . 
a stipulation describing the trial proceedings pertinent to each 
alleged error . . . certification that [counsel furnished 
indigent defendant with a copy of the brief] and . • . 
incorporat[ion], in as full detail as appropriate, any points the 
indigent has raised with counsel." Id. 
Defendant's brief contains a fact statement and an adequate 
description of the proceedings. Appellant's Brief at 2-4. 
Counsel then sets forth the binding legal authority which 
9 
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demonstrates that defendant does not have an appealable issue of 
any merit. Appellant's Brief at 4-7. 
Counsel cannot fulfill the remaining requirements of Clayton 
because counsel does not know the current whereabouts of 
defendant and therefore cannot ascertain the exact basis upon 
which defendant wished to lodge his appeal. Appellant's Brief at 
5. Counsel also cannot comply with the requirement of furnishing 
defendant with a copy of the brief or include arguments defendant 
wished to make. Consequently, defendant's counsel has complied 
with the requirements of Clayton to the extent possible. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL CORRECTLY CONCLUDES THAT 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE TRIAL 
REPRESENTATION AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State 
v, Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1995). However, when 
reviewing counsel's performance, this Court must indulge in a 
"strong presumption" that counsel's performance fell within the 
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance." state v. 
atemalixi, 805 p.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. , 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
On the existing record, defendant cannot overcome the strong 
i 
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presumption of reasonable representation because the trial record 
is devoid of any instances in which trial counsel deficiently 
represented defendant. In order to establish that counsel 
represented him ineffectively, defendant must overcome that 
strong presumption and show that nhis counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, " and that, 
but for the identified omissions or acts of trial counsel that 
there, is a "reasonable probability" of a more favorable outcome. 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688 and 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064 and 2068 (1984); State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 173 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Two attorneys represented defendant prior to conviction. 
The first attorney, David Maddox, represented defendant through 
the suppression hearing. Maddox moved to withdraw after 
defendant failed to maintain contact or pay for services rendered 
(R. 102-04). Defendant's second attorney, LaMar Winward, then 
entered an appearance and represented defendant through his 
guilty plea and sentencing (R. 108, 112, 115, 118, 120-21, 129-
30, 149-50, 158). 
Maddox' representation never fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. The sole issue in this case was the 
admissibility of the contraband uncovered during the search of 
11 
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defendant. During the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, 
Maddox cross examined the officers pointing out inconsistencies 
in their recollections of the type or color of the truck 
defendant was riding in immediately prior to the seizure and 
arguing that the truck did not fit the description provided by 
the juvenile informants (R. 215, 233, 262, 273). 
After he convinced the court that the questioning of the 
truck's passengers exceeded the permitted scope of a legitimate 
traffic stop (R. 271-73), Maddox focused on whether the 
questioning of defendant and the other passengers was supported 
by reasonable suspicion (R. 232, 273)• Maddox supported his 
argument to the trial court that the questioning was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion by directing the court to 
relevant authority (R. 234)(directing the court to State v. Case. 
884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) (holding police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant's vehicle when acting on 
uncorroborated police bulletin) and State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
761 (Utah 1991)(finding no reasonable suspicion that a car 
passenger committed a crime when officers believed car was 
stolen)). i 
After oral arguments on the motion to suppress the court 
believed the issue needed written memoranda from both sides 
12 
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before the court could come to a decision (R. 273) . Maddox 
timely submitted a written memorandum adequately supported with 
citations to pertinent authority (R. 83-97). Thus# Maddox 
effectively represented defendant and his conduct never fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.1 
Defendant's second attorney, LaMar Winward, was similarly 
effective. Winward's role was limited to arranging defendant's 
plea bargain and representing defendant at sentencing (R. 295-96, 
299-306, 309-11). Winward continued to represent defendant 
despite defendant's failure to maintain contact with him (R. 122, 
129, 130, 291). Winward explained defendant's guilty plea to him 
and believed that defendant fully understood the plea (R. 136). 
Winward also carefully directed the trial court's attention to 
all relevant mitigating factors during the sentencing procedure 
(R. 300-01). In defendant's own words, Mr. Winward, "said it 
all" (R. 301). Ultimately, Mr. Winward succeeded in reducing a 
second degree felony, a third degree felony, and a class A 
misdemeanor to two class A misdemeanors. 
Respite trial counsel's efforts, the court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress because it concluded that the 
officer's observations coupled with the tip from the informants 
provided reasonable suspicion for the officer's to question the 
truck's passengers (R. 73-80). 
13 
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On this record, defendant cannot overcome the strong 
presumption of reasonable representation, and this court should 
find that trial counsel adequately represented defendant. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
VOLUNTARILY WAIVED ALL PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS 
Defendant waived all pre-plea constitutional violations by 
entering an unconditional guilty plea. An unconditional guilty 
plea waives all appealable issues with the exception of the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea, including the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Sery. 758 
P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) ; S t a t e Y. J«ffl ingB, 875 P.2d 566 , 
567 (Utah App. 1994). Defendant was adequately informed of his 
right to appeal upon conviction, his right to have the State pay 
for his appeal if defendant was indigent and his right to 
assistance of counsel on such appeal, as well as all other 
constitutional rights under the State and Federal Constitutions 
(R. 131-33). Defendant has not alleged nor does the record 
indicate that defendant did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea 
(R. 134). On the contrary, defendant clearly indicated that he , 
entered the plea voluntarily. He was not coerced, threatened, or 
promised anything in return for his guilty plea (id). Thus, all 
14 
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other issues are deemed waived. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing arguments and defendant's Anders 
brief, this Court should unanimously conclude that defendant's 
arguments are wholly frivolous and without merit. As a result, 
this Court should dismiss defendant's appeal and grant his 
counsel's motion to withdraw. ^ ^ 
Respectfully submitted this . day of July, 1997 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Assistant Attorney General 
15 
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58-37.8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet. 
History: C. 1053,5S-37-7.5, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1995, ch. 333, § 4 
1995, ch. 333, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1,1995. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable tinder this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
240 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Xb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or famish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in Ueu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
Bubstance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications tinder 
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, 6ports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
243 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another 6tate for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to Vi the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether, the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or ihe conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9)(b). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 
76-3-203.5. 
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, t 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
f 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
( 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, { 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, { 1; 
1990, ch. 161, i 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, < 8; 1991, ch. 80, fi 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
( 4; 1991, ch. 268, { 7; 1995, ch. 284, fi 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last 
sentence in Subsection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-
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History: L. 1981, ch. 76, fi 4. 
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses, 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5. Cross-Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
enacted §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6. 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS private residence provides law enforcement of-
_ finals with probable cause to conduct a search 
J? t e n*; . . of the premises. State v. South, S85 P.2d 795 
Search and seizure. (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Although the plain smell doctrine provides 
Intent. officers probable cause to believe contraband or 
Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only evidence of a crime may be found, it does not 
intended to use the items as evidence in a automatically provide officers with exigent cir-
subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it cumBtances justifying a warrantless search of a 
was factually and legally impossible for the private residence. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 
defendant to have known that items sold would (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy, 
674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983). Cited in State v. Keiti, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah Search and seizure. 
The smell of marijuana emanating from a 
Ct. App. 1993). 
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right 
can exist in it. 
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